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Abstract
We present evidence on whether managerial entrenchment affects workers’ pay, using a large 
panel dataset that matches public firms with detailed data on their subsidiaries and workers.  We 
find that CEOs with a stronger grip on control pay their workers higher wages, but CEO 
ownership of cash flow rights mitigates such behavior.  Unionized workers and executives are 
found to get a larger share of the higher pay.  These findings do not seem to be driven by 
productivity differences or reverse causality, and are robust to a series of robustness checks.  Our 
evidence is consistent with an agency model in which entrenched managers pay higher wages 
because they come with direct private benefits for the manager, such as lower-effort wage 
bargaining and better CEO-employee relations, and suggests more broadly an important link 
between the corporate governance of large public firms and labor market outcomes.   
JEL classification: G32; G34; J31
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1. Introduction   
The long-recognized separation of ownership and control between shareholders and 
managers in the modern public corporation can play an important role in determining the level of 
pay both to a firm’s manager (who we will interchangeably refer to as the CEO) and to the firm’s 
workers.
1  Imagine an entrenched CEO who fails to experience pressure from the full range of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Such a CEO may be able to partly set his own pay.
2
However, there are several reasons to speculate that agency problems between shareholders and 
managers have an effect also on the pay of the firm’s other employees, such as its janitors or 
engineers.  This paper therefore presents evidence on the following question: do entrenched 
managers pay their workers more?   
In standard economic models of workers’ pay, agency problems between shareholders 
and managers play no role.  Wages are set to maximize firm value.  By contrast, in an agency 
model for workers’ pay, the manager compares his private benefits from the range of feasible 
wage policies, and chooses the one that is in his own best interest, though it may not necessarily 
be in the interest of value-maximizing shareholders.   
In principle, we can think of two types of private benefits to managers that may arise 
from higher employee compensation.  First, higher wages may provide a direct benefit in that the 
manager’s relations with workers are much easier and more enjoyable when workers are paid 
1 See Berle and Means (1932) for an early discussion of the effects of separation of ownership and control between 
shareholders and managers.   
2 Several studies have found that CEOs who seem to be entrenched from governance pressure are able to pay 
themselves higher levels of compensation.  Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that executives owning majority 
blocks receive larger salaries than executives in similar firms where shareholdings are more dispersed.  Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) present evidence consistent with CEOs at firms with greater agency problems 
between shareholders and managers receiving higher pay.  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001) report evidence 
of a “skimming” model in which CEOs working for poorly governed firms are able to pay themselves higher wages.  
Fahlenbrach (2006) tests an entrenchment hypothesis for CEO pay, and finds that CEOs receive higher total 
compensation when the balance of power between shareholders and managers is tilted towards management.   2
more.  For example, CEOs may want to pay more to blue-collar workers to avoid putting a lot of 
effort into negotiating with them, and in particular their unions.  Managers may also want to pay 
more to workers whose relations í at or outside of work í they enjoy the most, such as other 
executive-level employees.  However, only managers who lack financial incentives or who are 
entrenched against governance pressure can get these benefits of higher wages.
Second, higher wages may indirectly provide a benefit by protecting the manager’s job 
(and other control benefits) against pressure from outside shareholders and potential raiders.  For 
example, Hellwig (2000) talks about a “natural alliance” between managers and workers against 
hostile takeovers and proxy fights.  Krupp’s withdrawn tender offer for Thyssen is given as an 
example of workers and their unions assisting the incumbent CEO in resisting a takeover (though 
it eventually did go through).  Pagano and Volpin (2005) present a formal model of how a 
manager, through a high-wage policy, can create a management-labor alliance as protection 
against control threats.
Data availability is a serious obstacle for any study of managerial entrenchment and 
workers’ pay.  Clean data on CEOs’ control and financial incentives are difficult to obtain, and 
data on workers’ pay and other characteristics are often not publicly available.
3  We deal with 
these problems by combining several databases with detailed information on firms, subsidiaries, 
and workers in Sweden.  Data on CEOs’ control and incentives (measured by cash flow rights 
ownership) come from the Swedish Securities Register Center, which keeps a complete register 
of all shareholders of Swedish public companies.  Data on workers’ pay and other worker and 
subsidiary characteristics are from several of Statistics Sweden’s register-based databases.  
3 Consider for example data on wages.  Compustat reports firm-level wage data (Item #42; “Labor and related 
expenses”) for only about 18% of all available firm-year observations during the period 1995-2005.  More 
importantly, a crude analysis of these data suggests that companies reporting wages are not a random sample, with 
large, regulated, and financial firms being vastly overrepresented.   3
Matching these databases results in a large panel of more than two million firm-subsidiary-
worker-year observations which creates an opportunity to test predictions regarding managerial 
entrenchment and workers’ pay.   
Our main result can be easily summarized: entrenched managers pay their workers higher 
wages.  More specifically, CEOs with a stronger grip on control pay their workers more, but 
CEO ownership of cash flow rights mitigates such behavior.  This effect is larger for blue-collar 
workers than for white-collar workers, and largest for executives.  These findings do not seem to 
be driven by reverse causality or differences in productivity, and are robust to a series of 
robustness checks.  This evidence is consistent with a model in which CEOs value $1 of 
compensation at a lower cost than value-maximizing shareholders do, because higher wages 
come with direct private benefits, such as lower-effort wage bargaining with unionized workers 
and better professional or personal relations with other executive-level employees.
More broadly, our results suggest a link between corporate governance and workers’ pay.
With a few important exceptions, such a link has been largely unexplored.  Rosett (1990) finds 
that union employees suffer wage cuts after takeovers, and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find 
significant drops in white collar workers’ wages after ownership changes.  Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (1999, 2003) show that there was a significantly larger increase in wages for firms 
incorporated in states that passed state-antitakeover laws in the U.S. in the 1980s than in a 
control group.  While very informative about the effects of changes in ownership structures and 
pressure from anti-takeover laws, these studies provide no evidence on a link between CEOs’ 
control and incentives and workers’ pay.  The contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in the 
literature.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains why agency problems 
between shareholders and managers can affect workers’ pay.  Section 3 reviews important 
institutional aspects of the wage-setting process in Sweden, and describes our matched 
employer-employee dataset.  Section 4 presents our main results, and performs robustness 
checks.  Section 5 reports further evidence on the link between corporate governance and 
workers’ pay.  Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Agency theory and workers’ pay   
As mentioned in the Introduction, we can think of two types of private benefits to 
managers from higher workers’ pay: easier and more enjoyable worker relations, and protection 
against control threats.  We now elaborate on the theoretical foundations of such benefits.
2.1. Direct private benefits of higher wages: easier and more enjoyable labor relations
Higher wages can provide a direct benefit in that the manager’s relations with the firm’s 
workers are easier and more enjoyable when employees are paid more.  For example, while the 
CEO bears the full personal cost of putting lots of effort into wage bargaining with workers and 
their unions, much of a cash flow gain from a lower wage bill goes to the firm’s shareholders, 
not the manager.  The manager may also benefit more than shareholders do from better CEO-
employee relations, at or outside the workplace, in particular with the manager’s own co-
workers, such as other top-executives.  In the words of Jensen and Meckling (1976), CEOs’ non-
pecuniary private benefits may include “the attractiveness of the secretarial staff, the level of 
employee discipline, …, personal relations (“love”, “respect”, etc.) with employees” (p. 312).
One way of enjoying such private benefits is to pay workers more.5
On the other hand, CEOs are subject to incentives and pressure from governance 
mechanisms, including the ownership of cash flow rights in their firms (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)), the market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback (1983)), the managerial labor 
market (Fama (1980)), monitoring by large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), debt 
(Jensen (1986)), and product market competition (Hart (1983)).  While many managers would 
probably want to enjoy the benefits of higher workers’ pay, we predict that those who lack 
incentives or who are entrenched against governance pressure are actually able to do so.
The view that entrenched CEOs enjoy private benefits of easier and more enjoyable 
worker relations suggests that workers’ pay is positively correlated with measures of managerial 
control and entrenchment, but negatively correlated with measures of CEO incentives and 
pressure from governance mechanisms.   
2.2. Indirect private benefits of higher wages: protection against control threats
Higher workers’ pay can indirectly provide a benefit in that it protects the manager’s job 
(and other control benefits) against pressure from outside shareholders and potential raiders.
This view has been formally modeled by Pagano and Volpin (2005).  In particular, they show 
how an incentive-compatible management-labor alliance can arise.  In their model, a manager 
who values his job, but controls a stake that is lower than the controlling stake, might pay higher 
wages.  Through generous long-term wage contracts, managers can turn employees into a shark-
repellent: the inability to renege their wages transforms the firm into an unattractive takeover 
target.
4  Workers prefer the incumbent manager to a raider, and they can trust him, as the high-
4 A management-labor alliance may also arise from workers’ ownership of employer stock, e.g., through ESOPs.  
See Rauh (2005) for evidence that employee ownership reduces the likelihood of a takeover.  6
wage policy is in the manager’s own best interest.  This view suggests that workers’ pay is 
negatively correlated with measures of managerial control and entrenchment.
3. Institutional background and data  
3.1. Institutional background
Like in many other European countries, centralized binding collective agreements 
between employers associations and cartels of unions were an integral part of the wage-setting 
process in Sweden after World War II, covering more than 90% of workers.  However, over time 
bargaining has become increasingly decentralized.
5  Panel A of Figure 1 shows that for blue-
collar workers, the portion with firm- and combined firm/industry-level negotiations are 71-85% 
during the period that we study.  Panel B shows that for white-collar workers, the numbers are 
even higher, 96-99%.  In addition, the percentage of firm-level negotiations is probably even 
higher for our set of large public corporations than for the average firm in the population (for 
which these numbers apply).  Given these numbers, we can argue that although Sweden 
historically has been characterized by a high degree of centralization in the wage-setting process, 
wages are largely determined at the firm level during the period we study.   
3.2. Data sources and the matched employer-employee dataset
We combine data on firms (i.e., public corporations), their subsidiary companies and 
workers into a large matched employer-employee dataset.  Figure 2 explains the structure of the 
dataset.  Each worker has been linked to the subsidiary where he/she works through a unique 
5 Iversen (1998) constructs an index of centralization of wage negotiations by combining a measure of union 
concentration with one of the prevalent level of negotiation.  Prior to 1990, Sweden was oftentimes in the 
“centralized” category, but after 1990, Sweden is classified as “intermediary centralized” together with many other 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway.   7
personnummer (corresponding to U.S. Social Security numbers).  Each subsidiary and all its 
employees have in turn been linked to the public corporation to which it belongs via a unique 
organisationsnummer (which correspond to Employer Identification Numbers in the U.S.).  This 
matching process has been done each year 1995-2002, so an observation in our dataset is a firm-
subsidiary-worker-year observation.  We exclude banks and insurance companies as they are 
subject to special accounting rules and other regulations.
Data on workers and subsidiaries come from Statistics Sweden’s databases, in turn 
compiled the financial statistics (FS), the regional labor market statistics (RAMS) and the wage 
statistics (LS) registers.  Each year, the dataset contain a random sample of about two million 
workers (about 50%) of the labor force, which is representative of the population between 18 and 
65 years.  Since misreporting is prosecuted, and since these data have been subjected to quality 
controls by Statistics Sweden’s statisticians, measurement errors should be very rare.
The dataset contains detailed information on worker characteristics such as 
compensation, work hours, gender, education, experience, and occupation.  We define the 
variable Wage as the “gross real monthly full-time-equivalent compensation” for an employee.  
Gross monthly compensation is the sum of monthly net nominal earnings, i.e., wage/salary, 
bonus, overtime, supplementary allowance for unsocial hours and shift work, and payroll taxes.
Nominal compensation has been deflated by the CPI to get real compensation as of the end of the 
1995.  We use the exchange rate as of 12/31/1995, i.e. 6.65 kronor per dollar, when converting to 
dollars to facilitate interpretations.  The dataset also contains detailed information on a large 
number of accounting items together with a full description of subsidiary company 
characteristics (industry, region of location), plus other variables of economic interest usually not 
reported in accounting statements, such as employment variables.   8
Data on the degree of separation of ownership and control between shareholders and 
managers have been hand-collected from the annual book series Owners and Power in Sweden’s 
Listed Companies.
6  We define CEO Control to be one if the CEO owns more control rights 
(votes), than all other 5% blockholders together, and zero otherwise.  There are several reasons 
why we use this variable as our main proxy for the strength of a manager’s grip on the control of 
the firm.  First, it involves ownership of votes as opposed to ownership of cash flow rights, 
allowing us to separate control and incentive effects.  Second, it is a stringent definition of 
control.  Finally, it takes into account that a CEO has to own more votes to be considered “in 
control” in case other large blockholders – the most likely control contestants – also own larger 
stakes.  Thus, the level of votes needed to be “in control” is not arbitrarily set at, say, 25%, but it 
is determined for each firm-year observation depending on the firm’s particular ownership 
structure.  Since any empirical definition of managerial control is subject to the critique that it is 
simply one special proxy out of many possible ones, we perform several checks to ensure that all 
our results are robust to using some other reasonable proxies for CEO control.
We define CEO Incentive as the CEO’s percentage cash flow rights ownership in the 
firm, and we use this variable as a proxy for the extent to which the manager bears the full cost 
of a high-wage policy.  Data on other firm characteristics, such as company size and return on 
assets, come from MM Partners and SIX Findata, the main providers of accounting and stock 
market data for research purposes in Sweden.  All our results are robust to employing standard 
6 Starting in the early 1970s, the Swedish Securities Register Center, keeps a complete register of all shareholders of 
Swedish firms that are publicly traded.  Swedish ownership data are therefore uniquely detailed in an international 
comparison.  Since 1985, Sven-Ivan Sundqvist and Anneli Sundin compile raw data for each year in order to create 
“ownership coalitions,” appropriately accounting for indirect shareholdings through public or private firms, 
ownership by family members and foundations, and so on.  The particular dataset used in this paper was originally 
collected from Sundqvist and Sundin’s publications Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies by Cronqvist 
and Nilsson (2003), whose database has subsequently been used by several other researchers.   9
methods to deal with potential outliers in accounting and employment data, such as winsorizing 
at the 1% tails.
3.3. Summary statistics
Table 1 describes the dataset by year, industry, and region of location.  Panel A shows 
that, each year, there is an average of about 135 firms, 460 subsidiary companies, and 245,000 
workers.  In total, there are 286 unique firms, 1,344 unique subsidiaries, and 585,311 unique 
workers.  Panel B shows that about half of the employees work in manufacturing.  The two most 
common industries are “Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” (12.7% of 
the observations), which includes subsidiaries of firms such as Volvo, and “Manufacturing of 
radio, television and communication equipment“ (11.2%), which includes subsidiaries of e.g. 
Ericsson.  Panel C shows that 42.1% work in the metropolitan Stockholm region.   
Table 2 reports variable definitions and summary statistics for firms (Panel A), 
subsidiaries (Panel B), and workers (Panel C).  The CEO control and incentive variables and the 
variable Wage are of particular interest.  As can be seen in Panel A, 19.6% of the firms have a 
CEO with more control rights than all other 5% blockholders together.  The mean ownership of 
votes (cash flow rights) is 45.7 (26.0) percent, given that the CEO is a vote blockholder (i.e., has 
at least 5% of the votes).  Across all measures of control and incentives, the variation in CEO 
control and incentives is substantial.  For example, for CEO Votes (Incentive), the maximum is 
92.0% (78.1%) while the minimum is 0% (0%).  We see in Panel C that the mean annual wage is 
$38,635, and the standard deviation is $15,614 (converted into dollars as of the end of 1995).10
4. Results
4.1. Empirical specification  
Our primary empirical objective is to estimate the wage difference across firms with 
more and less entrenched managers.  To do this, we use the following specification of an 
individual worker’s pay:  
  
log  ijkt t it jt
C I ijkt kt kt
Wage Year Worker Subsidiary






where i indexes workers, j indexes subsidiaries, k indexes firms, and t indexes years. ijkt Wage  is 
a worker’s wage,  t Year  are year fixed effects,  it Worker  is a vector of worker characteristics, 
jt Subsidiary  is a vector of subsidiary characteristics (including 42 industry and seven region 
dummies),  kt CEO Control  and  kt CEO Incentive  measure the variation in the extent of the 
agency problem across observations, and   ijkt H  is an error term.  Our specification controls for 
fixed differences between industries and regions.  The year dummies also control for aggregate 
variation.  The estimates of the effects of CEO control and incentives,  C E  and  I E , are of 
particular interest in the following analysis.   
Our empirical approach of controlling for as much observable worker- and subsidiary-
level heterogeneity as possible may not be sufficient to completely eliminate all possible 
endogeneity concerns that one might have.  However, as we will describe more carefully below, 
we attempt to use the degree of detail in our dataset in various ways to deal with some important 
remaining concerns of the endogeneity of managerial ownership.   11
4.2. Effects of CEO control and incentives on workers’ pay  
In Table 3, we report evidence on the effects of CEO control and incentives on workers’ 
pay.  In column (1), we estimate equation (1), controlling for industry, region, and year fixed 
effects only.  In column (2), we include subsidiary-level controls, and in column (3) we include 
worker-level controls.  In column (4), we then add both these large sets of control variables.   
Before discussing the effects of managerial entrenchment, let us first briefly review other 
determinants of workers’ wages.  Consistent with a significant gender wage gap, we document 
that women are paid on average almost 14% less than men.  More education and experience is 
associated with higher pay: those with an undergraduate college education are for example paid 
about 48% more than those with only an elementary school education, and 10 years of work 
experience is associated with about 21% higher pay.  Higher-paying enterprises are also more 
capital intensive and more high-skilled-labor intensive, like in the study by Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999).  The coefficient on our proxy for size, log of number of employees, is positive, 
but unlike some other studies (e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989)) it is not statistically significant, 
perhaps because we are controlling for such an extensive set of other variables, or because there 
is no firm size wage premium in a sample of large public corporations.   
We now turn our focus to the effects of managerial control.  We find that a CEO with a 
stronger grip on the control of his firm pays higher wages to the firm’s workers: the estimated 
coefficient on CEO Control is consistently large and statistically significant at all levels in 
columns (1) to (4).  The estimated effect ranges from 0.072 to 0.057 and is economically large.  
For example, the estimate in column (4) implies that a CEO who controls more votes than all 
other  blockholders together pay about 6%, or about $2,200, higher wages, all else equal.   12
The table also provides estimates of the effects of managers’ incentives, measured by the 
CEOs’ cash flow rights ownership, CEO Incentive.  As can be seen, managers who hold more 
capital in their firms pay lower wages.  The estimated effect ranges from í0.295 to í0.198.  As 
for managerial control, the effect is economically large.  The estimate in column (4) implies that 
an increase in CEO Incentive by one standard deviation (14.7 percentage points) is associated 
with 2.9% lower wages, ceteris paribus.  Taken together, these results suggest that entrenched 
managers pay their workers higher wages: workers’ pay is positively correlated with CEO 
control, but negatively correlated with CEO cash flow rights ownership.
For space reasons, we summarize without directly reporting some basic robustness 
checks that we have performed.  (The results are available on request.)  First, we control for 
mean industry wage, or use industry and region trends, rather than including industry fixed 
effects; the results are unaffected.  Second, we exclude all part-time workers rather than 
calculating full-time equivalent wages; again, the results are unaffected.  Finally, since a majority 
(51.8%) of the employees work in manufacturing we check the extent to which this single 
industry drives our results by excluding all manufacturing industry employees.  Our results are 
robust to such a drastic change in sample composition and size.   
4.3. Evidence from alternative estimation methods  
There are at least two statistical concerns that one might have regarding the above results.
First, if the cross-sectional and serial correlations among workers within a firm are high, then the 
reported t-statistics are inflated if each worker-year is treated as an independent observation.  So 
far we have dealt with this concern using White’s (1980) standard errors adjusted for clustering 
of the observations at the firm level.  While many would probably consider this to be a 13
satisfactory remedy (see, e.g., the simulations in Petersen (2005)), below we consider alternative 
methods.  Second, because the analysis so far has been done at the worker-level, we put a lot of 
weight on large firms, with many employees, and little weight on smaller firms.  While this 
might be a relevant weighting scheme from a macroeconomic perspective, it may also imply that 
a few relatively large firms are driving the positive correlation between managerial entrenchment 
and workers’ wages.  Below, we also address this concern.   
We deal with the issue of cross-sectional correlation across workers in a given year by re-
estimating the coefficients and standard errors using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure 
(based on the specification in column 4 in Table 3).  The results are presented in column (1) of 
Table 4.  However, the Fama and MacBeth procedure does not take into account the potential 
problem of putting a lot of weight on large firms.  Nor does it address the problem of serial 
correlation of workers within a firm.  In an attempt to deal with both these concerns at the same 
time, we next implement another two-step approach.  First, we estimate the baseline specification 
but without the CEO variables.  Next, we collapse the estimated worker-year residuals by firm-
years and estimate the effect of CEO control and incentives in this collapsed dataset while 
adjusting the standard errors for clustering at the firm level.  The result of this estimation is 
presented in column (2).  As another alternative, we consider a similar approach.  First, we 
estimate the basic wage regression without the CEO variables, but with firm fixed effects.  Then, 
we regress the fixed firm effects on firm-average CEO control and incentives.  These results are 
reported in column (3).   
As can be seen in the table, our results are unaffected, or in some cases stronger, if we 
use any of these alternative estimation methods.  Thus, our result on managerial entrenchment 14
and workers’ pay do not seem to be driven by inflated t-statistics due to cross-sectional and serial 
correlation among workers in a firm, or by overweighting firms with many employees.
7
4.4. Do CEOs use a high-wage policy as protection against control threats?   
Recall that one view of managerial entrenchment and workers’ pay predicts that wages 
are negatively correlated with measures of managerial control, because managers who are not  
entrenched use higher wages as protection against control threats.  So far the evidence in Tables 
3 and 4 goes in the opposite direction: workers’ pay appears to be positively correlated with 
managerial entrenchment.  In Table 5, we now replace the CEO Control variable with several 
alternative measures of managerial entrenchment to test if this conclusion was driven by a 
specific empirical definition of managerial control.   
In column (1), we use CEO Votes, defined as the CEO’s percentage of the votes.  We see 
that CEOs with more votes pay higher wages to their workers.  In column (2), we also add (CEO
Votes)
2, showing that there is some, though weak, evidence that the marginal effect of CEO votes 
is decreasing in the degree of control.  Taking the (insignificant) squared term into account, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in votes ownership is associated with 2.4% higher wages.  
Figure 3 summarizes and quantifies the economic effects of managerial control and cash flow 
rights ownership on workers’ pay, in dollars per worker and year.
In column (3), we see that the CEO’s log votes-to-capital ratio, another measure of the 
CEO’s control wedge, is positively related to workers’ pay.  According to our estimates, a CEO 
with a V/C-ratio equal to the mean (1.86) pays 2.2%, or about $850, higher wages compared to a 
CEO with no wedge, all else equal.  The result for the V/C-ratio comes with the advantage that it 
                                                
7 An alternative robustness check is to drop the largest firms from our sample.  Our results are robust to dropping the 
20% of firms with most employees.   15
applies to all firms and is continuous throughout the sample, though it is a less stringent measure 
than CEO Control.
Furthermore, column (4) reports 4.5% higher wages when the CEO is the largest owner.  
In column (5), we see that when a CEO has “practical” control, defined as having more than 25% 
of the firm’s votes, wages are 4.5% higher.  Finally, in column (6), we find that CEOs with 
majority control pay their workers 3.9% higher wages.  The evidence of a positive correlation 
between various CEO control proxies and wages seem inconsistent with the view that managers 
use their firms’ wage policy to protect themselves against control threats.
8
4.5. Omitted variables: Firm and CEO characteristics   
One concern with regard to our main results is that firms with more and less agency 
problems between shareholders and managers may differ also along other dimensions.  As a 
result, comparing wages across firms with more and less entrenched managers may simply 
capture the effect of such differences rather than an effect of CEO entrenchment per se, and these 
omitted variables may bias the estimated coefficients on  C E  and  I E .  To address this concern we 
estimate equation (1) except that we now also add firm-level and CEO characteristics that may 
be related to both CEO entrenchment and wages:  
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where   and 
kt Firm CEO  is a vector of firm and CEO characteristics.  As many of these 
characteristics may be endogenous to managerial ownership (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 
                                                
8 A more direct test of the Pagano and Volpin (2005) model would require us to identify firms that face takeover 
pressure, in which case a high-wage policy to create a management-labor alliance as protection against control 
threats should be more valuable.   16
(1985)), we prefer not to include them in our baseline specifications, but rather verify that our 
results do not change when we include them.   
Table 6 reports our results. In column (1), we include return on assets as a proxy for 
firm-level profitability.  In column (2), we add firm size, defined as the log of gross sales.  In 
column (3), we add the firm’s proportion of fixed assets.  In column (4), we include the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities as it may be argued that many firms 
with a large number of growth opportunities, such as high-tech firms, often have managers with 
considerable control and at the same time pay their workers high wages as compensation for 
their specialized skills.  In column (5), we include the number of two-digit industries that a firm 
is operating in as a proxy for the level of diversification.  We do so because entrenched CEOs 
have more discretion to engage in conglomerate-building, and because Schoar (2002) reports that 
workers in diversified firms are paid a wage premium.  In column (6), we include CEO age.  
Older CEOs may have weaker incentives to work hard to keep down the total wage bill, and at 
the same time, older CEOs may have accumulated more voting rights in the firm.  Finally, 
column (7) includes all the firm and CEO controls at the same time.   
Our results are unaffected by including these additional firm-level and CEO 
characteristics.  Thus, there is no evidence that such characteristics are responsible for the effects 
of managerial entrenchment on workers’ pay.  In unreported regressions, we have checked that 
our results are robust to including an even larger set of controls (e.g., the log of firm age), though 
we have a large number of missing observations on these variables, or lots of noise in the data 17
(e.g., firm age is truncated because all firms established prior to 1973 are assigned this year as 
their starting year).
9
4.6. Effects of productivity and employment risk
The evidence that entrenched managers pay their workers more is consistent with agency 
problems between shareholders and managers affecting workers’ pay.  However, an alternative 
interpretation is that firms with entrenched CEOs are more productive and that workers share the 
profits; see, e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) for evidence on rent-sharing.
Entrenched CEOs may provide more “stakeholder protection” (e.g., Shleifer and Summers 
(1988)).  That is, CEO control may allow the manager to make long-term commitments to 
workers.  As a result, workers are willing to make firm-specific human capital investments 
without fear of expropriation.  In such an incomplete contracts setting, it can be optimal to let 
workers (who make the firm-specific investment) be the residual claimant.  The relation between 
managerial entrenchment and workers’ pay may thus be explained by a combination of higher 
profitability and rent-sharing in firms with entrenched CEOs.   
We test this alternative explanation by controlling for productivity as carefully as our 
dataset allows.  In column (1) of Table 7, as a measure of productivity, we include log (Sales / 
Employee).  Consistent with rent-sharing theories, the estimated coefficient on this measure is 
positive (0.032) and statistically significant at all levels.  The change in magnitude of the 
estimate on CEO Control is fairly small; it drops from 0.057 to 0.049.  That is, higher 
                                                
9 The arguments by Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2006) suggest that workers may require a wage 
premium for human-capital investments in firms that are likely to go bankrupt.  If firms with CEOs with more 
control for some reason are more likely to go bankrupt, then our result might be due to a bankruptcy premium in 
workers’ wages.  However, arguments along these lines are unlikely to explain the higher workers’ pay in our 
sample of mostly large established public corporation.   18
productivity appears to be able to explain only a small fraction of the higher pay associated with 
entrenched CEOs.   
While sales per employee is easily observable, and thus appropriate from a contracting 
and rent-sharing perspective, it has no real sense of profits in it. In column (2), we therefore add 
a possibly more precise proxy for productivity, log (Value added / Employee), although we have 
a larger number of missing observations for this variable.  When including this productivity 
measure, the estimate on CEO Control does not change.  That is, controlling for value added per 
employee as a proxy for profitability does not change the effect that we have so far attributed to 
managerial entrenchment.   
Another alternative explanation for our evidence is that the higher pay is a premium for 
greater risk of being (arbitrarily) fired by a powerful, entrenched CEO.  We address this 
interpretation by controlling for “employment risk.”  In column (3), we include Employee
turnover, defined as the number of workers hired plus workers leaving divided by the average 
number of employees during the year.  Adding this variable does not eliminate the effect of CEO 
entrenchment.  In column (4), we include Employees leaving, defined as the number of workers 
leaving the firm divided by the average number of employees during the year.  This is a more 
precise proxy for the probability of being fired, although there are of course many other reasons 
for why an employee may leave a company.  Once again the CEO entrenchment effect remain 
unchanged.  Thus, it appears unlikely that the higher pay is a premium for a higher risk of being 
fired by an entrenched CEO.   19
4.7. Addressing reverse causality: CEO tenure and founder-CEO status
So far we have argued that more managerial control is associated with higher wages, and 
not the reverse.  However, suppose a corporate raider believes that a firm pays excessive 
compensation to its workers.  As a result, the raider might be attracted to the company, acquire a 
substantial control stake, and become the CEO in an attempt to restructure the firm by reducing 
the wage bill to make a profit.  Such cases might show up as a positive relation between 
managerial control and workers’ pay in our regressions, at least before the raider is able to cut 
workers’ pay, a process which is likely to take some time.   
In column (1) of Table 8, we attempt to address reverse causality by re-estimating the 
baseline specification, but restricting our analysis to firms with CEOs with at least three years 
tenure.  We choose three years because this corresponds roughly to the average employer-
employee contract length in our sample, providing a CEO with a chance to actually reduce 
(relative) wages.  If our results were driven by raiders who are about to reduce wages, we should 
find a smaller or no effect when restricting our analysis to CEOs with longer tenure.  However, 
our finding that the estimated effect of CEO Control is larger for CEOs with more than three 
years tenure (7.9% vs. 5.9%) is inconsistent with reverse causality.   
To further address reverse causality we focus on a category of CEOs for which this is less 
of a concern: founder-CEOs.  In column (2), we find a significant effect for founder-CEOs, 
similar in magnitude to the one documented above for all managers (6.3%).  The evidence of a 
significant positive effect among founder-CEOs is also inconsistent with a reverse causality 
interpretation of the link between CEO entrenchment and workers’ pay.   
Finally, in column (3), we again restrict our analysis to firms with CEOs with at least 
three years tenure.  We find that the effect of managerial control is somewhat larger for non-20
founder-CEOs than for founder-CEOs (7.8% vs. 6.0% higher pay). This evidence suggests that 
the link between CEO control and higher workers’ pay is not the result of non-founder-CEOs, 
i.e., potential raiders, attempting to cut wages.  In contrast, our results suggest that an effect of 
CEO control on workers’ pay is not immediate, but arise over time as the CEO becomes more 
entrenched.
10
4.8. Fixed effects specifications  
One concern is that we have so far not appropriately controlled for industry, firm, and 
worker heterogeneity.  An alternative specification could include firm fixed effects to absorb 
additional productivity differences.  However, as managerial ownership change only gradually 
over time, such a specification is problematic; see, e.g., Zhou (2001) for a discussion of the firm 
fixed effects regressions employed by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) in another setting.
We therefore attempt to further control for firm-level heterogeneity using two different sets of 
fixed effects, for which identification is not an issue.   
First, in column (1) of Table 9, we include fixed effects corresponding to 14 different 
“collective bargaining agreement areas.”  This is a union-based, i.e. labor-economics-based, 
industry classification, rather than the standard product-market based industry classification.  As 
such, it should better capture effects on workers’ pay that are specific to a particular bargaining 
area, e.g., a particular union (or its president) being particularly powerful during the period we 
study.  Second, in column (2), we replace the 42 two-digit fixed industry effects with 149 three-
digit fixed effects.  This specification may absorb additional industry-level variation.  However, 
                                                
10 To deal with reverse causality concerns in the rest of the paper, we focus on CEOs with at least three years tenure.   21
as can be seen, our results on CEO entrenchment are unaffected by controlling for union fixed 
effects and very detailed industry fixed effects.
For a worker fixed effects specification, we face a similar identification problem as the 
above.  Several of the worker-level characteristics change only gradually, such as experience, or 
are generally constant over time (e.g., gender).  In addition, with a short time-series, 
identification comes from few managerial ownership and worker changes.  To illustrate this 
problem, only 2.4% of the firm-years change CEO control status, and only 1.8% of the worker-
years change employment from a firm with one CEO control status to another.
To circumvent these problems as much as possible given our data limitations, but still try 
to control for sorting of workers across firms with more or less entrenched CEOs, we propose the 
inclusion of occupation fixed effects.  Our dataset identifies 26 different occupations/ 
professions; two examples being “engineering work” and “work that requires theoretical special 
competence in the area of computer science.”  We see in column (3) that including these fixed 
effects significantly improves the model fit, measured by adjusted R-squared.  Most importantly, 
however, consistent with entrenched managers paying their workers more, we find that CEO 
control (incentives) is positively (negatively) correlated with workers’ pay, even after controlling 
for worker-level heterogeneity by occupation fixed effects.
4.9. Addressing causality: Evidence from centralized vs. decentralized bargaining regimes  
We want to argue that the above evidence suggests that entrenched managers pay their 
workers higher wages.  Even after our attempts to deal with the endogeneity of managerial 
ownership, productivity differences, and reverse causality, a causal interpretation may not be 
fully convincing.  We therefore propose an alternative approach to addressing causality.  More 22
specifically, we compare the effects of managerial entrenchment on workers’ pay under 
centralized and decentralized bargaining regimes.   
Prior to 1990, wages were largely determined by centralized negotiations.  When pay is 
set by centralized bargaining there is little room for wages to be affected by managerial 
entrenchment (there might have been some “wage drifting” at the firm level, e.g., aiming at 
reducing the gender wage gap).  However, a major regime shift in labor relations took place in 
1990: the Swedish Employers’ Confederation decided to no longer participate in centralized 
negotiations.  Since 1990, centralized agreements only concern non-wage issues, e.g., workers’ 
safety.  The 1990 regime shift provides exogenous variation in CEOs’ ability to increase 
workers’ pay, which we will now explore.  In particular, we predict a stronger relation between 
managerial entrenchment and workers’ wages under a decentralized regime, because entrenched 
CEOs then actually have the ability to pay their workers higher wages if they want to.   
Table 10 reports our results.  We find no significant relation between CEO Control and 
CEO Incentive, respectively, and workers’ pay in 1990.  We do not have worker-level data for 
1990, restricting our analysis to the subsidiary company level, though, from our previous results, 
it seems reasonable to assume that not controlling for worker characteristics is likely to 
overestimate any effects of managerial entrenchment.  The evidence from 1990 as a control year 
is very important.  If we had found a similarly strong effect of managerial control and incentives 
for 1990 as we do for 1995-2002, that would suggest that the CEO control and incentive 
variables proxy for something other than managerial entrenchment.  That is, the results from 
contrasting the effects of managerial entrenchment under centralized and decentralized 
bargaining regimes is perhaps the most direct evidence that entrenched CEOs pay their workers 
more.23
5. Additional evidence on managerial entrenchment and workers’ pay   
So far we have shown that there is a robust association between managerial entrenchment 
and workers’ pay.  We now present some additional evidence on this link.  We first examine 
who, i.e. which groups of employees, get a larger share of the higher wages.  In an agency model 
for workers’ pay, we would expect managers to give a relatively larger share to those who 
provide particularly large private benefits.  Thereafter, we attempt to extend our analysis by 
presenting some evidence on the extent to which governance pressure (other than CEOs’ cash 
flow rights ownership) also constrain managers from paying high wages.   
5.1. Effects on worker subgroups’ pay
One private benefit of higher wages is easier worker relations.  Such gains might be 
particularly large when it comes to negotiating with unionized workers.  Unfortunately, worker-
level data on unionization are not available, as it is illegal to collect such data in Sweden.  
However, blue-collar workers are significantly more unionized than white-collar workers.  
Comparing the estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11, we see that the effects of CEO
Control and CEO Incentive are larger and statistically more significant for blue-collar than for 
white-collar workers (8.8% vs. 5.2%).  This evidence is consistent with CEOs benefiting 
relatively more from paying higher wages to unionized workers, possibly because of lower-effort 
wage bargaining when they do so.
Another benefit from higher wages is more enjoyable CEO-employee relations, in 
particular with those who the CEO interacts with on a regular basis.  While we do not have data 
on CEOs day-to-day calendars, managers of large public corporations interact most with their 
firms’ executives.  We define an “executive” as someone who is the CFO, COO, or a division 24
head or vice-president at the subsidiary level.  (Unfortunately, we are unable to identify members 
of the CEO’s secretarial staff.)  In column (3), we find a sizeable effect of managerial control on 
executives’ pay: CEOs in control pay their executives about 20% more.
11  The incentive effect is 
also strong.  Figure 4 summarizes and quantifies the economic effects of CEO control on 
workers’ pay for subgroups of workers.  Additional (unreported) evidence shows that this effect 
is stronger when the geographical distance between the CEO and the other executive is relatively 
short, although that effect is not significant at the 10%-level.  These results suggest that 
entrenched CEOs pay higher compensation to employees whose professional or personal 
relations they, themselves, enjoy or benefit from the most, at or outside of work.   
5.2. Other corporate governance mechanisms and workers’ pay
The analysis so far has focused on the role that CEOs’ ownership of cash flow rights play 
in constraining managers from paying higher wages.  However, cash flow rights ownership is not 
the only constraint that a manager may be subject to.  We therefore extend our analysis by 
examining the extent to which governance mechanisms more broadly constrain managers from 
paying high wages.  If our results indicate that managers that are subject to less governance 
pressure pay their workers more, then our overall conclusion of a significant link between 
corporate governance and workers’ pay is strengthened.   
We examine the link between corporate governance pressure and workers’ pay by 
estimating equation (1) except that we also include proxies for some governance mechanisms:   
                                                
11 Very few of these 3,400 executives are on the board of directors, so it is unlikely that the higher compensation 
acts as a “bribe” to allow the CEO to pay himself more.   25
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where kt Governance  is a vector of corporate governance mechanisms that may constrain a 
manager from paying higher wages.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of a large shareholder improves 
monitoring.  We therefore conjecture that managers are likely to pay lower wages in the presence 
of a large outside shareholder.  We define Outside individual blockholder as a dummy that is one 
if an individual (other than the CEO) has more than 5% of the votes, and zero otherwise.  We 
define Outside institutional blockholder as a dummy that is one if an institution has more than 
5% of the votes, and zero otherwise.  This category includes banks, money managers, insurance 
companies, etc.  Consistent with a large outside shareholder constraining managers, we find in 
Table 12 that an outside individual blockholder reduces workers’ pay by about 3.5%.
Jensen’s (1986) view that high debt levels constrain managers from diverting free cash 
flow (in this case through higher wages) underlies several important models, e.g. Stulz (1990), 
and Hart and Moore (1990).
12  We define Leverage as total liabilities divided by total assets at 
the firm level.  Consistent with debt constraining managers, we find that firms with more debt 
pay their workers lower wages.  A one standard-deviation-increase in leverage (0.171) is 
associated with 1.3% lower wages.  This finding is qualitatively similar to Hanka (1998) 
evidence using firm-level U.S. data.   
Hart (1983) argues that product market competition may reduce managerial discretion.  
Managers may be constrained from paying high wages when operating in more competitive 
12 Another view is that managers use debt strategically in bargaining with workers and their unions; see, e.g., 
Bronars and Deere (1991), Perotti and Spier (1993), and Matsa (2006).   26
industries.  We define Product market competition as a Herfindahl index of three-digit industry 
sales.  Since we lack data on sales for the population of corporations for 1995, we cannot 
construct this variable for that year.  We see that firms in more competitive industries pay their 
workers lower wages.  An increase in competition (i.e., a decrease in the Herfindahl index) by 
one standard deviation (0.077) amounts to 1.5% lower wages.
Overall the above evidence suggests that corporate governance play an important role for 
workers’ pay in large public corporations.
13
6. Conclusions
We present evidence on the extent to which managerial entrenchment affects workers’ 
pay, based on a large panel dataset that matches public companies with detailed data on their 
workers.  We find that CEOs with a stronger grip on control pay their workers higher wages.
Because cash flow rights ownership by a CEO is negatively correlated with wages, we interpret 
the higher workers’ pay as evidence of agency problems stemming from the separation of 
ownership and control: if it was optimal for managers with more control to pay higher wages, 
then they would pay even higher wages when they have more incentives to do so through more 
cash flow rights ownership in their firms.   
Our evidence that entrenched CEOs prefer to pay higher wages rather than delivering 
larger residual cash flows to shareholders suggests that  Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2000, 
2001) notion of “skimming” in the pay-setting process goes way beyond the CEO’s own pay.
13 One caveat is that a firm’s capital structure decision is itself subject to the same managerial discretion as workers’ 
pay.  Managerial entrenchment may therefore also affect leverage; see, e.g., Stulz (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), 
and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997).  Another issue that naturally arises in this context is whether various 
governance mechanisms substitute or complement each other in constraining management.  It is however beyond the 
scope of the current paper to explore these issues.   27
Entrenched and poorly governed CEOs who have captured the pay-setting process seem to give 
higher pay also to their firm’s employees, in particular unionized workers and other top-
executives.  Effects of managerial entrenchment on compensation in public corporations may 
therefore be much larger in dollar terms than previously thought, because they disseminate down 
and out in the organization.  As recognized by Shleifer and Summers (1988), this may be 
because “managers become ‘addicted’ to stakeholders who form such an important part of their 
life (in contrast to constantly changing shareholders).”   
Several important questions regarding corporate governance and workers’ pay remain 
unanswered.  First, does it make a difference if we extend the analysis of this paper to other 
countries with different governance structures, where the ease with which entrenched managers 
can pay higher wages may be different?
14  The private benefits from easier worker relations may 
be larger in countries (or industries within a particular country) with stronger unions and/or 
longer-term wage contracts.  Second, does the separation of ownership and control between 
shareholders and managers affect other sources of compensation than wages, e.g. employee stock 
option grants, or even other labor market outcomes?  Finally, to what extent are employees like 
janitors and engineers paid for “luck”?  For example, when the world market price of oil goes up, 
and oil company profits soar for reasons beyond management’s and employees’ control, do 
workers then get paid more when the firm’s CEO is entrenched?   
14 To date, large matched employer-employee datasets for research purposes appear to be more readily available for 
civil-law countries such as France (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)) and Italy (e.g., Guiso, Pistaferri and 
Schivardi (2005)) with weaker investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)), than 
for common-law countries, like the U.S.   28
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Table 1 
The matched employer-employee dataset   
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  The table decomposes the 
dataset by year, industry, and region of location.  Panel A reports the number of workers, subsidiaries, and 
firms by year.  Panel B reports the distribution of workers across the ten most common industries.  There 
are 42 industries, based on EU’s two-digit standard classification of economic activities, Nomenclature
des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE).  Panel C reports the distribution of 
workers across regions.   
Panel A: Number of workers, subsidiaries, and firms by year  
Year Workers  Subsidiaries    Firms 
1995 215,816  632  109 
1996 257,032  413  103 
1997 284,821  448  123 
1998 259,885  445  138 
1999 236,122  416  144 
2000 252,890  451  150 
2001 229,310  418  149 
2002 220,458  389  153 
Total year-observations  1,956,334  3,612  1,069 
Unique observations  585,311  1,344  286 
Panel B: The distribution of workers across industries 
Industry   %
Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  12.8 
Manufacturing of radio, television and communication equipment  11.2 
Construction   11.0 
Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products  8.3 
Manufacturing of  machinery and non-electric equipment  8.1 
Manufacturing of basic metals  5.3 
Computer services (including software production and other related activities)   4.8 
Other business services (e.g., legal, accounting, consulting, advertising)   4.5 
Manufacturing of other transport equipment  3.6 
Manufacturing of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  2.4 
Manufacturing industry   51.8 
Panel C: The distribution of workers across regions  
Region   Definition   % 
Stockholm Metropolitan Stockholm and suburbs   42.1 
Other metropolitan areas   Other metropolitan areas than Stockholm   23.4 
Major cities   Municipality population t 90,000 within 30 km radius from center   21.2 
Mid-sized cities   90,000 > Municipality population t 27,000 within 30 km radius from 
center, and population t 300,000 within 100 km radius  9.3 
Smaller cities   90,000 > Municipality population t 27,000 within 30 km radius from 
center, and population < 300,000 within 100 km radius  3.0 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 3 
Effects of CEO control and incentives on workers’ pay   
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  We compute White’s (1980) 
standard errors adjusted for clustering of the observations at the firm-level to account for the 
presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO  Control  0.072 0.064 0.057 0.057 
  (3.57)*** (3.59)*** (3.98)*** (4.07)*** 
CEO Incentive  í0.295  í0.246  í0.209  í0.198 
  (4.69)*** (4.82)*** (4.77)*** (4.70)*** 
Subsidiary-level controls
Fixed assets / Employees    0.003  0.003 
   (3.40)***  (3.60)*** 
Log (Employees)     í0.000   0.002 
   (0.16)  (0.77) 
Proportion  high-skilled  workers   0.490  0.145 
   (16.45)***    (4.37)*** 
Proportion low-skilled workers    í0.134  í0.166 
   (1.86)*    (3.03)*** 
Worker-level controls
Female     í0.138  í0.139 
     (22.11)***  (22.58)*** 
Education 2      0.034  0.033 
     (7.97)***  (8.16)*** 
Education 3      0.075  0.070 
     (13.09)***  (13.00)*** 
Education 4      0.195  0.185 
     (15.41)***  (15.01)*** 
Education 5      0.253  0.238 
     (24.18)***  (22.43)*** 
Education 6      0.503  0.482 
     (36.71)***  (31.20)*** 
Education 7      0.711  0.686 
     (52.54)***  (45.85)*** 
Experience     0.026  0.025 
     (11.89)***  (11.57)*** 
(Experience)
2 / 100 í0.040  í0.040 
     (10.50)***  (10.23)*** 
Industry, region, and year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1,956,334 1,956,334 1,956,334 1,956,334 
R-squared  0.19 0.22 0.49 0.49 Table 4 
Evidence from alternative estimation methods  
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  The table reports second-stage 
estimates from alternative estimation methods.  In column (1), we estimate the coefficients and 
standard errors using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure.  In column (2), we estimate the 
specification in column (4) in Table 3 without the CEO variables, and then we collapse the 
estimated worker-year residuals by firm-years and estimate the effect of CEO control and 
incentives in this collapsed dataset while adjusting the standard errors for clustering at the firm 
level.  In column (3), we estimate the specification in column (4) in Table 3 without the CEO 
variables, but with firm fixed effects, and then we regress the fixed firm effects on firm-average 
CEO control and incentives.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote that the 
value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  Fama-MacBeth  Collapsing by firm-years  Collapsing by firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
CEO Control  0.058  0.054  0.068 
 (5.44)***  (2.99)***  (2.12)** 
CEO Incentive  í0.161  í0.131  í0.177 
 (10.61)***  (3.02)***  (2.27)** 
Subsidiary-level controls     
Fixed assets / Employees   0.006     
 (2.40)***     
Log (Employees)   0.002     
 (1.02)     
Proportion high-skilled workers  0.072     
 (1.83)*     
Proportion low-skilled workers  í0.254    
 (10.70)***     
Worker-level controls     
Female  í0.138    
 (184.33)***     
Education 2  0.031     
 (4.88)***     
Education 3  0.067     
 (8.32)***     
Education 4  0.183     
 (74.00)***     
Education 5  0.234     
 (61.99)***     
Education 6  0.480     
 (74.57)***     
Education 7  0.685     
 (69.85)***     
Experience 0.026     
 (33.97)***     
(Experience)
2 / 100 í0.040    
 (22.45)***     






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7 
Effects of productivity and employment risk   
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  Worker/Subsidiary controls 
refer to the control variables included in column (4) of Table 3.  We compute White’s (1980) 
standard errors adjusted for clustering of the observations at the firm-level to account for the 
presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO  Control    0.049 0.058 0.046 0.045 
(3.30)*** (4.07)***  (2.51)**  (2.50)** 
CEO Incentive  í0.169  í0.192  í0.164  í0.164 
(3.65)*** (4.48)*** (2.71)*** (2.72)*** 
Productivity measures      
Log (Sales / Employee)  0.032       
  (6.84)***     
Log (Value added / Employee)   0.014    
   (2.20)**    
Employment risk measures    
Employee turnover        0.003   
     (0.50)  
Employees leaving         0.007 
      (1.14) 
Subsidiary controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, region, and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  1,940,568 1,880,654 1,511,231 1,255,930 
R-squared  0.49 0.48 0.48 0.46 Table 8 
Addressing reverse causality: CEO tenure and founder-CEO status  
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  Worker/Subsidiary controls 
refer to the control variables included in column (4) of Table 3.  We compute White’s (1980) 
standard errors adjusted for clustering of the observations at the firm-level to account for the 
presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
Founder vs. Non-founder CEOs 
CEO tenure t 3 years  All CEO tenure t 3 years 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CEO Control   0.076     
 (3.70)***     
CEO Incentive  í0.235    
 (4.83)***     
Founder u CEO Control   0.061  0.058 
   (2.50)**  (2.15)** 
Founder u CEO Incentive  í0.214  í0.211 
   (3.81)***  (3.48)*** 
Non-founder u CEO Control   0.037  0.075 
   (1.65)  (3.24)*** 
Non-founder u CEO Incentive  í0.098  í0.159 
   (0.94)  (1.78)* 
Subsidiary controls  Yes Yes Yes
Worker controls  Yes Yes Yes
Industry, region, and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes
N  1,463,937 1,956,334 1,463,937 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.49 Table 9 
Fixed effects specifications  
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  Worker/Subsidiary controls 
refer to the control variables included in column (4) of Table 3.  In column (1), we replace the 
industry fixed effects with union fixed effects corresponding to 14 different collective bargaining 
agreement areas, i.e. a labor-economics-based industry classification.  In column (2), we replace 
the 42 two-digit industry fixed effects with 149 three-digit industry fixed effects.  In column (3), 
we add occupation fixed effects for 26 different occupations/professions.  We compute White’s 
(1980) standard errors adjusted for clustering of the observations at the firm-level to account for 
the presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
denote that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) 
CEO  Control  0.073 0.081 0.074 
(3.81)*** (3.79)*** (3.82)*** 
CEO Incentive  í0.195  í0.248  í0.232 
(3.63)*** (4.66)*** (4.29)*** 
Subsidiary controls   Yes Yes Yes
Worker controls   Yes Yes Yes
Region, and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes
Industry (two-digit)fixed effects  Yes No Yes
Union fixed effects  Yes No No
Industry (three-digit) fixed effects  No Yes No
Occupation fixed effects  No No Yes
N  1,463,937 1,463,937 1,195,541 
R-squared  0.47 0.50 0.56 Table 10 
Addressing causality: Evidence from centralized vs. decentralized bargaining regimes  
In this table, we analyze 1990 as a control year because wage bargaining was largely centralized 
till 1990.  As we do not have worker-level data for year 1990, this is a subsidiary-level analysis 
where the log of mean wage at the subsidiary level is the dependent variable.  Variable definitions 
are in Table 2.  We compute White’s (1980) standard errors adjusted for clustering of the 
observations at the firm-level to account for the presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote that the value is significantly different from zero at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 (1) 
CEO Control  0.004 
 (0.07) 
CEO Incentive  í0.105 
 (0.80) 
Subsidiary controls  Yes 
Worker controls  No 
Industry, and region fixed effects  Yes  
Year fixed effects  No 
N 852 
R-squared 0.37 Table 11 
Effects on worker subgroups’ pay   
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  Subsidiary/Worker controls 
refer to the subsidiary/worker-level control variables included in Table 3.  Blue-collar workers are 
those with occupations that belong to the national cartel of blue-collar worker unions.  White-
collar workers are those with occupations that belong to the national cartel of white-collar worker 
unions.  Executives are CFOs, COOs, or a division heads and vice-presidents at the subsidiary 
company level.  We compute White’s (1980) standard errors adjusted for clustering of the 
observations at the firm-level to account for the presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote that the value is significantly different from zero at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 Blue-collar  workers  White-collar workers  Executives
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
CEO Control  0.088  0.052  0.197 
 (2.93)***  (2.35)**  (1.86)* 
CEO Incentive  í0.260  í0.156  í0.831 
 (3.93)***  (2.54)**  (3.40)*** 
Subsidiary controls  Yes Yes Yes
Worker controls  Yes Yes Yes
Industry, region, and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes
N 779,769  684,168  3,400 
R-squared 0.38  0.50  0.44 Table 12 
Other corporate governance mechanisms and workers’ pay   
The sample is the matched employer-employee dataset described in Section 3.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The dependent variable is log (Wage).  Worker/Subsidiary controls 
refer to the control variables included in column (4) of Table 3.  We compute White’s (1980) 
standard errors adjusted for clustering of the observations at the firm-level to account for the 
presence of cross-correlations in data.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
that the value is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Control  0.078 0.082 0.082 0.089 
  (3.49)*** (3.69)*** (3.74)*** (3.55)*** 
CEO Incentive  í0.258  í0.266  í0.247  í0.309 
  (4.93)*** (4.78)*** (4.77)*** (5.08)*** 
Corporate governance mechanisms 
Outside individual blockholder  í0.017    í0.017 
 (1.69)*      (1.76)* 
Outside institutional blockholder  í0.007    í0.012 
  (0.67)    (1.34) 
Leverage   í0.079  í0.078 
   (2.58)**  (2.41)** 
Product market competition       0.192  0.197 
     (1.72)*  (1.96)* 
Subsidiary controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, region, and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  1,463,937 1,463,937 1,270,396 1,270,396 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 Figure 1
The wage formation process in Sweden  
The figure illustrates the fraction of workers for which wages are determined, respectively, at the 
industry-, combined firm/industry-, and firm-level during the period 1993-2003.  The data come 
from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.   
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 Figure 3 
The economic effect of managerial entrenchment on workers’ pay  
The figure summarizes and quantifies the economic effects of managerial control and incentives 
on the average worker’s pay, in dollars per year.  CEO Control is a dummy variable that is one if 
the CEO owns more control rights (votes), than all other 5% blockholders together, and zero 
otherwise.  CEO Votes is the CEO’s percentage of votes in the firm.  CEO Incentive is the CEO’s 
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CEO Control CEO Votes CEO IncentiveFigure 4 
The economic effect of managerial entrenchment on worker subgroups’ pay   
The figure summarizes and quantifies the economic effects of managerial control for subgroups 
of employees.  Blue-collar workers are those with occupations that belong to the national cartel of 
blue-collar worker unions.  White-collar workers are those with occupations that belong to the 
national cartel of white-collar worker unions.  Executives are CFOs, COOs, or a division heads 
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